The Legal List
Our quarterly feature that enumerates recent GVP-related court decisions
By: Dru Stevenson
As the news zooms past us in our digital age, clickbait headlines and incendiary stories often grab the attention, while the far more effectual realities of local and national court decisions can get buried in the information blizzard. Despite recent reputational dents to the judicial process, the courts remain an important and often last hope for the American experiment.
For gun violence prevention advocates specifically, court decisions can seem especially complex and mislaid in the face of the everyday tragedies of gun violence.
So each quarter — with the help of our colleague Dru Stevenson — we compile The Legal List, a concise inventory of recent GVP-related cases from across the country to help you see where we stand in our battle against the gun lobby.
A phenomenon I noticed while collecting and summarizing these cases is that most of the circuit courts have now published holdings upholding laws like the felon-in-possession statute (Sec. 922(g)(1)) — the Seventh Circuit just joined all the other circuits in rejecting “facial” Second Amendment challenges to that law — as well as some other laws like the machine gun ban. This means more of the cases that pop up are summary decisions where the court just says (in so many words), “We already decided this issue in previous case ___.” I think the courts are holding onto cases about drug users while we wait for the Supreme Court to decided that issue this term.
The case I think might have interest for academics is United States v. Fort, in which the defendant tried to use the reasoning in Heller that “self-defense is the core right of the Second Amendment” to argue that he should have an expanded right to shoot people in self-defense. The legal rules about killing in self-defense make it rather restricted and usually not applicable, apart from the issue of modern “stand your ground” laws.
I’ve been waiting for a case for awhile that would raise this argument, because it highlights the internal contradictions in the Heller-Bruen framework in a way that academics have not discussed very much.
Federal Circuit Court Published Decisions in Second Amendment Cases — March - May 2026
This update covers new holdings and decisions in reported/published opinions from the federal circuit courts for March 1-May 31, 2026. I did not include cases where the circuit court had already decided the issue in previous cases, and simply stated that the issue was foreclosed by circuit precedent.
The decisions in this period were mostly wins for upholding gun safety laws (waiting periods for gun purchases, felon-in-possession bans, bans on machine guns and silencers, domestic violence misdemeanor prohibitions, and those unlawfully present in the country).
The only substantial loss for the sake of gun safety was the Second Circuit’s decision in Christian v. James about carrying guns on private property open to the public, which is also the subject of a case pending before the Supreme Court this term.
United States v. Wendt, 168 F.4th 1068 (8th Cir. March 3, 2026) (possession of machine gun and lying on government permit forms)
In United States v. Wendt, the Eighth Circuit vacated Wendt’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) for possessing a machine gun, holding that the “public authority” exception in § 922(o)(2)(A) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because the statute failed to define what it means for possession to be “by or under the authority” of a government agency. The dispositive facts were that Wendt, a small‑town police chief, had acquired machine guns using “law letters,” but the statute provided no clear standard for determining when such possession was authorized, rendering the prohibition unenforceable against him; the court did not reach a Second Amendment holding on § 922(o). At the same time, the court upheld Wendt’s convictions on charges of lying on government forms in the purchase of the firearms (he claimed to buy them for the police department, but then immediately resold them at his gun store and pocketed the profits), so his five-year sentence remained intact. The Second Amendment issue in this case would apply only to law enforcement officers or other government officials seeking to invoke the statutory exception for them to have machine guns for government use.
United States v. Ducksworth, 168 F.4th 764 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 2026) (felon-in-possession)
In United States v. Ducksworth, the Fifth Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) did not violate the Second Amendment as applied to a defendant who admitted he was on parole at the time he possessed the firearm, noting that United States v. Kimble squarely foreclosed as‑applied challenges by individuals under felony supervision. The court therefore affirmed the conviction. An interesting aspect of this case was a clarification of the Fifth Circuit’s “predicate felony” rule, which for an “as-applied” Second Amendment challenge looks solely at the original felony for which the defendant was convicted, and ignores all other evidence of dangerousness (such as recent arrests or misdemeanor convictions). Ducksworth alleged that the government had the burden to submit evidence about his specific predicate felony. The court rejected this argument.
United States v. Landrum, 168 F.4th 771 (5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026) (felon-in-possession)
In United States v. Landrum, the Fifth Circuit rejected a challenge to the federal felon gun ban on grounds that Bruen and subsequent 5th Circuit decisions had rendered the law unconstitutionally vague — that is, Bruen had “rendered § 922(g)(1) unconstitutionally vague by requiring courts to perform unpredictable historical analyses to determine the constitutionality of convictions under the statute.” The court rejected this argument because “vagueness” challenges focus on the vagueness of the statute, not the confusing judicial interpretations of it. The court also rejected his facial and as-applied challenges to the statute as being foreclosed by the circuit’s prior decisions. Landrum’s prior drug‑trafficking felonies and his possession of a firearm while on supervised release placed him squarely within categories the court had already deemed historically disarmable under United States v. Kimble and United States v. Giglio.
United States v. Martinez, 169 F.4th 1147 (9th Cir. March 18, 2026) (domestic violence misdemeanor conviction)
In United States v. Martinez, the Ninth Circuit upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), the domestic‑violence‑misdemeanant firearm prohibition, holding that the statute is constitutional both facially and as applied. The dispositive facts were that each defendant had a prior misdemeanor conviction involving the use or attempted use of physical force against an intimate partner, and the court concluded that § 922(g)(9) fits within the historical tradition — recognized in Rahimi — of disarming individuals who pose a clear threat of physical violence.
United States v. Hostettler, 170 F.4th 539 (6th Cir. March 20, 2026) (felon-in-possession)
In United States v. Hostettler, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of a § 922(g)(1) indictment and remanded for application of the proper Bruen/Williams standard, holding that the defendant bears the burden of showing he is not dangerous in an as‑applied challenge. The dispositive facts were that the district court had considered only Hostettler’s felony record and not his multiple misdemeanor assault and domestic‑violence convictions, or his supervised‑release status, which the Sixth Circuit deemed essential to determining whether he fell within the historically disarmable category of dangerous individuals. At the same time, the court noted that the defendant would have the opportunity on remand to offer evidence that he was not in fact dangerous, in which case he could still win an acquittal.
United States v. Watson, 171 F.4th 1012 (7th Cir. April 2, 2026) (felon-in-possession)
In United States v. Watson, the Seventh Circuit rejected both a facial and an as‑applied Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) brought by a defendant with a prior felony conviction for drug distribution. Applying Bruen and Rahimi, the court held that felons remain among “the people,” but § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Watson because his prior drug-distribution conviction was inherently dangerous, and historical tradition supports categorical disarmament of dangerous individuals and severe penalties — including death — for violent felonies. The court held that the statute is constitutional on its face, and that the defendant’s convictions were too serious to support an as-applied constitutional challenge. The court expressly declined to decide whether § 922(g)(1) could be unconstitutional as applied to non‑dangerous felonies.
United States v. Prince, 171 F.4th 1009 (7th Cir. April 2, 2026) (felon-in-possession)
In United States v. Prince, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s facial invalidation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court held that the statute is valid in many applications, and therefore cannot be unconstitutional on its face under Bruen or Rahimi. Because the defendant had prior convictions for armed robbery and aggravated battery and was arrested while using a firearm to threaten passengers on public transit, the court noted that he did not even argue an as‑applied challenge. The Seventh Circuit left open whether § 922(g)(1) might be unconstitutional as applied to non‑dangerous felonies.
Karwacki v. Kaul, 171 F.4th 1006 (7th Cir. April 2, 2026) (military convictions as prohibiting felonies)
In Karwacki v. Kaul, the Seventh Circuit rejected a Second Amendment challenge to Wisconsin’s firearm‑possession bar for persons convicted of crimes elsewhere that would be felonies in Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)(b), holding that the statute was constitutional both facially and as applied. The dispositive fact was that Karwacki’s military conviction was for distributing peyote, which the court characterized as a drug‑distribution offense closely associated with firearm‑related violence. Relying on Rahimi’s principle that governments may disarm individuals who present a credible threat to others, the court concluded that persons with drug‑distribution convictions fall within the historically permissible category of dangerous individuals who may be disarmed.
Beckwith v. Frey, 171 F.4th 560 (1st Cir. April 3, 2026) (gun purchase waiting periods)
In Beckwith v. Frey, the First Circuit considered a Second Amendment challenge to Maine’s statute imposing a 72‑hour waiting period before firearm delivery (Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 25, § 2016). The court held that the law does not regulate conduct covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text, because the law governs only the timing of acquisition rather than the keeping or bearing of arms. Treating the statute as a presumptively lawful condition on commercial sales, the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to show the waiting period was “abusive” under Bruen’s footnote 9 and therefore were not likely to succeed on the merits, vacating the preliminary injunction.
United States v. Alsenat, __ F.4th __ (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2026) (machine guns)
In United States v. Alsenat, the Eleventh Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits possession of machine guns, does not violate the Second Amendment because machine guns are “dangerous and unusual” weapons not protected under Heller and Bruen. The dispositive fact was that the defendant possessed machine gun‑conversion devices, which are statutorily defined as machine guns, and the court concluded that such weapons fall outside the historical tradition of arms in common lawful use.
United States v. Vizcaíno‑Peguero, __ F.4th __ (1st Cir. May 5, 2026) (those unlawfully present in the country)
In United States v. Vizcaíno‑Peguero, the First Circuit upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A) against an as‑applied Second Amendment challenge, holding that even assuming the defendant was among “the people,” the statute aligned with a longstanding tradition of disarming individuals lacking allegiance or a regulable relationship to the sovereign. The court found the historical analogues — such as disarmament of Loyalists, Catholics, and others presumed loyal to foreign powers — relevantly similar under Bruen and Rahimi.
United States v. Rebollar‑Osorio, __ F.4th __ (1st Cir. May 5, 2026) (those unlawfully present in the country)
In United States v. Rebollar‑Osorio, the First Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which bars firearm possession by aliens “illegally or unlawfully” in the United States, is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation under Bruen. The court concluded that historical analogues — such as founding‑era disarmament of persons lacking allegiance to the sovereign — were sufficiently similar in both purpose and method to uphold the statute as applied. This opinion was released as a companion case to United States v. Vizcaíno‑Peguero, above.
United States v. Speed, __ F.4th __ (4th Cir. May 5, 2026) (silencers)
In United States v. Speed, the Fourth Circuit rejected a Second Amendment challenge to the National Firearms Act’s regulation of silencers, holding that the federal shall-issue permitting program for silencers is constitutional under Bruen. It also rejected a claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Speed. The court therefore upheld the defendant’s conviction for possessing unregistered silencers under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).
United States v. Fort, __ F.4th __ (1st Cir. May 12, 2026) (felon-in-possession, self-defense)
In United States v. Fort, the First Circuit rejected an as‑applied Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) brought by a defendant who shot two people during an altercation after arming himself, despite having multiple prior violent felonies. The remarkable feature of this case is Fort’s attempt to turn use the Second Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s insistence that it codified a right of self-defense, to argue for an expanded right to self-defense that would have justified shooting two people during an argument over the victims scuffing his car. The court held that Fort could not invoke a justification‑based Second Amendment theory because he armed himself before any imminent threat existed, defeating both the common‑law justification defense and any broader self‑defense theory under Heller or Bruen. Because the facts showed unlawful possession unconnected to any immediate danger, the statute was constitutional as applied. This case highlights the contradiction between the holding in Heller that self-defense is the “core right” of the Second Amendment and the longstanding legal requirements for a valid claim of self-defense.
Christian v. James, __ F.4th __ (2d Cir. May 18, 2026) (locations guns are permitted)
In Christian v. James, the Second Circuit evaluated two provisions of New York’s Concealed Carry Improvement Act: (1) the Private Property Provision banning firearms on private property open to the public absent express consent, and (2) the Public Parks Provision banning firearms in public parks. The court held that the private‑property rule violated the Second Amendment as applied to property open to the public, because the state failed to identify historical analogues restricting carriage on publicly accessible private land. Conversely, it upheld the public‑parks ban against a facial challenge, finding a sufficient historical tradition of firearms restrictions in urban parks beginning in the mid‑19th century, which Bruen permits courts to consider for historically novel settings.
McCoy v. Jacobson, __ F.4th __ (8th Cir. May 26, 2026)
Truck drivers with public carry permits in Florida and Georgia sued Minnesota, saying they should have a right to carry guns while driving through Minnesota. Minnesota has a shall-issue public carry permit program, as well as a reciprocity statute, but the plaintiffs did not want to obtain another permit for Minnesota; and Minnesota’s reciprocity statute did not recognize the permits of Florida and Georgia because they were not similar to Minnesota’s permitting rules. The court held that there was no Second Amendment violation here, because Minnesota’s shall-issue permit law is constitutional under Bruen, and because the Second Amendment does not require states to have automatic reciprocity for the gun laws of other states.
Dru Stevenson is the Vinson & Elkins Research Professor at South Texas College of Law - Houston, where he teaches legal ethics, regulatory law, and law & economics. He devotes his academic research and writing primarily to firearms regulation and Second Amendment issues, and has published numerous academic articles on these topics.
Photo by Katrin Bolovtsova; via Pexels.